Pan-Africanism; Which way Africa? Part II (transition to AU)
By Paul T. Shipale

The focus of Pan-African activities shifted to the African continent following the Fifth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England. Soon after, the Pan-African continental movement fractured into two major ideological blocs, namely, the Casablanca progressives led by Ghana and the Monrovia conservatives led by Nigeria, Liberia and most of the French-speaking African countries.

The Casablanca group which consisted of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Algeria, Congo, Mali, Tanzania, and Egypt favored political integration as a prerequisite to economic integration. The twenty-four members of the Monrovia bloc considered their political independence to be still very fragile and therefore advocated a gradual approach to the question of African unity and favored a functional approach to African cooperation over those of the Casablanca bloc that advocated integration based on the institutional framework of a “federalist model.” Subsequently, the idea of a continental unity based on the federal model was shelved and despite the serious split between the two groups over the speed and scope of African integration, the two blocs came together in Addis Abba, Ethiopia to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on May 25, 1963.

As was the rivalry of Nkrumah with his colleagues, so also were some African leaders initially wary of al-Qadhaffi’s diplomatic initiative to form a single union with a permanent headquarters located in Libya and with himself elected as the executive chairman/president. The Constitutive Act of the African Union like the OAU charter was a compromise document between those led by Libya that advocated for immediate and total unification of Africa, and the gradualist approach based on the European Union model favored by Nigeria and some other OAU member-states. The AU project was in fact carried forward by al-Qadhaffi’s willingness to fund it: Libya has provided more than one million dollars to facilitate the transition from OAU to AU (Derrick, 2001).

The renewed debate on African integration is whether the objective of building the United States of Africa should support the processes of socioeconomic and political transformation of African states and societies either through a process of immediate creation of a central government or through ‘gradual incrementalism’ or functional evolution of African state-system. However, such a shift in sovereignty to a supranational authority would probably entail some versions of federalism. By federalism we mean a process that seeks simultaneously to meet the need for more effective governmental action in some domains (through centralization) and the democratic postulate of local control and local autonomy (through decentralization) (Haas,1970:624).

The point of federalism as a process is succinctly stated in Friederich’s work. In keeping with recent trends in political science, the main question is: What function does a federal relationship have?—rather than: What structure? (Friedrich, 1968:173). The federalists have long assumed that the establishment of political organization and processes that can address political issues has the goal of promoting even greater unity and development. Proponents of this direct ‘top-down approach’ to integration argue that this will fast-track the timetable for addressing the most important political question of state sovereignty, viewed as an obstacle to intra-African cooperation (in contrast to functionalism-‘bottom-up approach’) (Wolfers,1965:28).

However, some realist analysts have expressed skepticism about Africa’s ability to sustain one territorial jurisdiction (Jackson, 1993; Mbeki, 2004). Hence, the argument for a ‘neo-functional approach’ to integration which ascribes a dynamic role to individuals and interests groups in the process of integrating pluralist communities.

It took almost two years of debate and controversy to bring the idea of African Union to reality. The establishment of the AU first initiated by Col. al-Qadhaffi during the thirty-fifth OAU Algiers Summit in July 1999, was an historic event with far-reaching consequences for the struggle for unity and integration of the African continent. Although the Libyan proposal came as a surprise to African leaders, they soon accepted the idea in the Declaration of Sirte and the draft constitution was later adopted at the 36th OAU summit in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000. The AU was formally launched by African Heads of State in Durban, South Africa, on July 9, 2002.

For African leaders, the African Union (AU), as a new continental organization, provides the architecture for promoting a new approach to African security, political and economic integration (see Constitutive Act, 2000, arts. 3 & 4). The thirty-seventh OAU Lusaka Summit in 2001 also adopted the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), as a blueprint for full-scale socio-economic development of the continent, aimed both at intensifying existing regional and continental economic integration schemes (as envisaged in the Abuja Treaty) and creating new modalities of interaction with the developed world and multilateral institutions based on mutual respect, good governance, responsibility and accountability.

However, unlike ‘the Lagos Plan of Action,’ an African initiative that advocates ‘collective self-reliance,’ NEPAD is based on the neo-liberal economic development strategy foisted on Africa from abroad in the name of globalization (Olukoshi 2002, Chabal 2002, Owusu 2003, Bond 2004, Murithi 2005). As Cecil Blake has correctly alleged: “What one obtains in Africa presently appears to be a blind acceptance of an ideological definition provided only by the North and used as leverage for development assistance… the institutions mimic the structures of the colonial powers” (Blake, 2005:590-92).

While its critics have questioned whether the AU will become an efficient and effective body or will become as moribund as the OAU (its predecessor), it is possible to briefly highlight the contrast between the two constitutional frameworks of the two organizations. Despite its commitment to the territorial integrity of African states, the AU Constitutive Act explicitly acknowledged the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in order ‘to restore peace and stability,’ to prevent genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Art. 4 (h). The AU incorporates a range of stronger sanctions into its Constitutive Act than the OAU (AU Charter art. 23 (2)).While it maintains similar OAU Charter provisions and practices in admitting African members, the AU has the power to exclude member government from its activities. The OAU Algiers Resolution that stated that no leader who comes to power in a military coup will be recognized by the OAU was extended to include leaders getting into power through any unconstitutional means (Art. 30).

In spite of the euphoria and exaggerated optimism that marked the launching of the AU as a new phase in the struggle for African unity, there are still several obstacles and challenges to the process of unity and development in the continent.

Geographical and Historical Challenges
The African continent is made up of several countries which differ significantly in size, demographic trends, levels of economic development, language, culture, societal norms and natural resources endowment. Nigeria has the highest population density of about 140 million people; South Africa has the most developed economy with a capacity that is almost equal to that of forty other sub-Saharan countries combined; South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria account for half of the continent’s GDP and nearly a third of its total population; Gabon has a very small population but large oil deposits; Botswana and Namibia have diamond mines and a multiparty democracy; Sierra Leone and Liberia, though impoverished because of years of civil war, have diamond mines too. Therefore, any prospects for integration must take into account the magnitude of all these societal and ecological disparities.

Security Challenges
How can the African Union guarantee the right to free movement of persons in an atmosphere of xenophobia, given the ethnically and racially motivated violence in many parts of Africa? The treatment and intolerance of refugees in many African countries such as the deportation of Nigerians and Zimbabweans as economic migrants are not consistent with the calls for African solidarity or free labor migration even if at times, they too, behave as if they own the country and run it as they wish. Some ethnic leaders and warlords of sub-national groups, who cannot become rulers of existing countries, have capitalized on ethnic divisions and persistent internal instability to organize secessionist movements aimed at creating new states under their control in order to gain international recognition. These domestic squabbles and internal ethno-religious conflicts are not just confined within the state borders but have also spilled-over to the neighboring countries, thereby exacerbating the general security threats to the African states-system either as a whole as well as its constituent parts.

Political Challenges
“In practical term…, any short term successes are likely to be hidebound-if not prevented-by Africa’s well-established governance problems such as personal rule, clientelism, corruption, etc. The logic of neo patrimonialism underpins politics in Africa and rules out the very type of policies that NEPAD advocates, such as accountability and good governance “(Taylor, 2005:159).

Economic Challenges
Despite the Commission for Africa’s recommendations that the growth of intra-regional trade should be facilitated and nurtured, Economic Partnerships Agreement (EPAs) look set to create more barriers to trade within Africa. According to the recent research at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), EPAs are likely to harm regional integration in the developing countries (Stevens, C. and Kennan, J 2005). The available crucial indices on trade, poverty alleviation, and debt, indicate that Africans are living on less than one dollar per day, in spite the fact many African countries devalued their currencies, engaged in the liberalization and deregulation of trade, and privatized many of the public utilities as recommended by international lending institutions. This is because a large part of the African investment surplus leaves the continent as debt repayment, expatriation of profit, capital flight, etc.

In order to reverse the acute environmental problems, poverty, hunger, health and unemployment that plague many African countries, it is necessary to have an integrated investment in the fields of education, science, technology, research and human capital development. The real challenge before the African leaders as they revisit Pan-Africanism as a blueprint for African unity and development is whether they have the political will and exceptional leadership skill to rekindle such a strategic vision that will unite and transform the continent into an integrated, stable, democratic and prosperous society. That task is more urgent today than at any time in Africa’s post-colonial history, given the imperatives of socio-economic and political challenges confronting the continent.

Amical Cabral once said “As long as imperialism exists, an independent African State must be a liberation movement in power, or it will not be independent” and I should add, we must be ‘liberation movements’ fighting under a common ideological umbrella of Pan-Africanism for the unity of our people at home and abroad. We can start by appointing our sisters-in-law, such as Madams Guriras and Akweeke as ambassadors, PSs or Ministers to show how serious we are with the ideals of Pan-Africanism.