So, after subjecting him to intense debriefing, his South African handlers then directed him to put together a tribal political outfit that would enable him to qualify for membership in the DTA, which is an alliance of tribal factions. The South Africans believed that Muyongo possessed the kind of leadership qualities and experience which the DTA lacked to gain the necessary acceptance as a genuinely national political party.

In line with his masters’ instruction, Muyongo then proceeded to put together a new political outfit in the Caprivi. This is called the United Democratic Party (UDP); and, in turn, this enabled him to join the DTA. Once inside that party, he was catapulted to the position of being President of the DTA.

This was, once more, luck coming his way. He could have used that opportunity to compensate for the other squandered chances. From that vantage point, he could have played a significant role in the consolidation of democracy, peace and stability in the country. He could also have helped to shape a more constructive and coherent DTA political agenda during those eight years which he served as its leader in Parliament. But, true to type, he failed dismally in all these. Instead, he led that party to crushing defeats by SWAPO in the 1989 independence and all the other elections.

Specifically, the following events were critical in dealing the DTA, under Muyongo, a fatal blow in that region. The first of these was the firing of Felix Mukasa from that party and his position as Governor of the Caprivi Region. This came on which it previously had a majority. At that same time, Muyongo suffered a personal setback that came with the announcement by the influential Mafwe sub-chief Simasiku of his long-time SWAPO membership. Indeed, with that announcement, the trickle, which was able to mislead hundreds of a demagogue, Muyongo, people in his tribal surrounding, blind loyalty among those such a fantasy. But exploiting that Caprivi was never part of the SWAPO Government in re-

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ers and DTA members. As it became clear that the DTA grip on the Caprivi Region had decisively broken, Muyongo was shown up to be a politically spent force that no longer added any value to the DTA’s effort to strengthen its already shaky position in the country. With this, the jockeying for his position started within his party. Muyongo then resorted to his characteristic brinkmanship. He resumed his dancing on the edge of the volcano by clandestinely organizing an armed band of his followers to ostensibly wage a war of separation from the rest of Namibia. He promised the members of the band that they would be provided with weapons, training and sanctuary by UNITA and Lozi irredentists in Zambia’s West-

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