Omugulu-
gombashe
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be overrun. They had adopted scientific guerrilla tactics and maintained absolute vigilance and mobility, moving in sections and platoons. They constantly carried surprise attacks, and caused heavy enemy casualties with minimum losses on our side. In later years this mobility was achieved not only by tough training in covering long distances rapidly on foot, but was also aided by the use of bicycles which enabled them to move even faster, and even to carry heavy weapons such as 122mm rocket launchers and ground-to-air missiles.

Nevertheless, as I April 1989 drew nearer, the South Africans were in a better position than ever before to identify the location of PLAN fighters. In October 1989, a journal called Top Secret, quoting London press sources, wrote: “At the beginning of March the CIA had provided the South African military intelligence service with the latest surveillance data gathered by plane and satellite concerning SWAPO bases within Namibia. It was clear to both Washington and Pretoria that there already SWAPO units in Namibia. Moreover, some of their bases had been clearly identified.”

Our men lay low even after South Africa had separated, on 22 March 1989, signed the cease-fire letter drawn up by the UN Secretary-General’s office. They would not meet us to sign the cease-fire jointly in a proper manner because South Africa still pretended that SWAPO did not exist. Not for one moment did we trust the South African government to honour its undertakings under the Tripartite Agreement or Resolution 435 without attempting to detail the UN Plan. We always expected that South Africa would use more delaying tactics and dirty tricks. We had prepared several options, each with its alternatives and fallbacks, to ensure that South Africa would be kept in line with the UN plan.”

One of these options was to retain our combatants in their northern and eastern regions inside the country, ready in their positions, while the UN peace-keeping force of UNTAG military and civilian components commenced with the objective of full implementation of UN Resolution 435. However, I made categorically clear that if the South African apartheid regime were allowed to continue to torpedo the implementation, the armed liberation struggle would continue and would intensify.

Some critical arithmetic: 7,500 minus 3,500 = 4,000

We struggled hard, assisted by many friendly governments and organisations, to defeat the proposal that the peace-keeping force be reduced. It was the Americans who initiated the reduction of the UN peace-keeping force from the full complement of 7,500 down to 4,000. They claimed that the UN had no money to pay for a force of 7,500, and succeeded in reducing all the permanent members of the Security Council on their side. The Reagan administration took ad-vaantage of the changes in Washington leadership, and Gorbachev leaned towards the West and was less supportive of the national liberation movements in Africa, in contrast to his aim in 1979, who were taken advantage of and opposed any attempt at torpedoing the implementation of UN Resolution 435.

The Western Permanent Members of the Security Council made it clear that their governments were not prepared to pay for the cost of the full 7,500 force with which we had opposed any attempt at torpedoing the implementation of UN Resolution 435.

In an attempt to present a false picture of the implementation of Resolution 435, SWAPO appealed to the UN and offered to repay the full UNTAG operational costs against apartheid, with the promise of the UN being able to return the full complement of UNTAG’s arrival in Namibia, with further consequences that assisted those intent on torpedoing the implementation of Resolution 435. General Pem Chund in command of the military component of UNTAG arrived in Windhoek on 26 February, and on 1 March, at the end of the cease-fires, a group of RVs was made available to our armed forces, and of these scarcely a handful were in the northern Namibian war zone.

My own movements were regularised in the early months because we were not in the need to be with our military forces at Headquarters in Luanda and with the SWAPO Political Headquarters in Lusaka. So much of our fight- ing had been done by men and women who had opposed any attempt at torpedoing the implementation of UN Resolution 435.

The Commanders expressed strong misgivings about our agreeing to the demobilisation of PLAN and the ending of the armed lib- eration struggle.

There was a huge task awaiting us back home and we could lose no time in preparing the way, particularly in facing the economic problems confronting the country. I addressed the Council of Ministers of the South African Development Coordinating Conference (SADC) in Lusaka on 3 February 1989, and outlined the fu- ture role we could play in co-operation with Angola, Botswana and Zambia, particu- larly in dealing with the region’s transport problems. I also warned that apartheid South Af- rica would do all in its power to “undermine and prede-